Previous findings suggest that planning an action "backward-primes" perceptual dimension related to this action: planning a grasp facilitates the processing of visual size information, while planning a reach facilitates the processing of location information. Here we show that dimensional priming of perception through action occurs even in the absence of active action planning. Subjects watched video clips showing a grasping or reaching action before detecting size-or location-defined deviants in visual stimulus sequences. Size deviants were detected faster after seeing a grasp and location deviants were detected faster after seeing a reach. This supports the assumption that perceptual codes and action plans share a common representational medium, and that "attention to action" controls "attention to stimuli".
In order to interact successfully with objects and individuals that crowd our environment, we need to continuously select both the appropriate response to the perceptual events we face and the relevant sensory information for accomplishing that act. However, how the perceptual and action information is coded to be promptly available is still a matter of debate. Recently, the hypothesis suggesting a common-coding system for both action and perception (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001a) has garnered increasing support. This hypothesis challenges the classic assumption that stimuli and responses are separate and hierarchically distributed entities, and rather asserts they are coded as event-related features in a common format (i.e., referring to the distal features of the external event).
Given the functional equivalence of perception-and actionrelated codes, bi-directional priming effects are predicted between the representations of stimuli and actions as a function of the number of feature codes they share (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Prinz, 1990 Prinz, , 1997 . In line with these predictions, recent behavioral and neurophysiological evidence shows not only that cognitive processes (underlying perception, attention, and mem- * Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 06 49917663; fax: +39 06 4451667.
E-mail address: sabrina.fagioli@uniroma1.it (S. Fagioli). ory) prime the selection of feature-overlapping actions, but also that planning a task and an action affects perceptual processes. For instance, selecting and processing visual stimuli is modulated by task requirements and the actions those stimuli afford (Fisher & Hoellen, 2004; Hannus, Cornelissen, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2005; Memelink & Hommel, 2006; Tucker & Ellis, 1998) , as well as by the type of action the perceiver is currently performing or observing (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Bernstein & Cooper, 1997; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Miall et al., 2006; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003; Wohlschläger, 2000) . Along the same lines, experiments using positron emission tomography (PET) have revealed increased activity of cortical areas known for being involved in action generation, when subjects discriminate objects compared to non-objects (Grèzes & Decety, 2002) .
Further support for the common-coding hypothesis comes from studies addressing the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons have been described as a special category of visuo-motor neurons, discharging for both performed or observed actions (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996) . Activity of such neurons has been recorded in the premotor cortex of the monkey, but there is increasing evidence for the existence of an analogous system in humans (Iacoboni et al., 1999; see Rizzolatti & 
